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Burke: Conflict of Laws, Torts: Florida Abandons Lex Loci Delicti
CONFLICT OF LAWS, TORTS: FLORIDA AND
LEX LOCI DELICTI
Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., No. 35,203 (Fla. Sup. Ct.,
Feb. 1, 1967)
Plaintiff, individually and as executrix of her husband's estate,
filed separate actions for wrongful death in a federal district court
against Northwest Airlines, Inc. and Lockheed Aircraft Corp. Decedent, a Florida resident, purchased a round-trip ticket in Florida
from Northwest Airlines and was killed when the airplane crashed
in Illinois. Plaintiff settled out of court with Northwest for 32,500
dollars. The trial judge then entered summary judgment for the
other defendant, Lockheed, on the ground that plaintiff was barred
from any further recovery because the Illinois Wrongful Death Statute
limits recovery to 30,000 dollars.1 Plaintiff contended on appeal that
the Illinois Wrongful Death Statute was not controlling; that the
Florida Wrongful Death Statute, which contains no limitation of
recovery, was applicable. 2 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 3 was
unable to determine if the Florida courts would apply the Illinois
limitation of recovery and certified the following question to the
Florida Supreme Court: "Would the State Courts of Florida, for
reasons of public policy or otherwise, refuse to apply the Illinois
limitation of damages in the above situation, and if so, would any
limitation of damages apply?" 4 The Florida Supreme Court HELD,
Florida's courts would refuse to apply the Illinois 30,000 dollar limitation of damages and, under the facts given in the certificate, would
apply no limitation of damages. Justices Drew and Thomas dissented.
The traditional solution of conflict of laws problems has been to
apply the rule of lex loci delicti, which requires that the place where
the wrong was committed supplies the applicable substantive law. 5
The theory of "vested rights" is the basis of this choice-of-law formula
controlling multi-state tort actions, that is, a right to recover for a
tort is created by the law of the jurisdiction where the injury occurred
and depends on that jurisdiction's law for its existence and extent.0
It was the rule adopted by the First Restatement of Conflict of Laws.5
The advantages of the rule of lex loci delicti are uniformity, certainty,
and ease of application." Despite these advantages the rule has been
1. ILL. REv.

STAT.

ch. 70, §§1-2 (1963).

2.

FLA. STAT. §768.01 (1965).

3.
4.
5.

Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 358 F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1966).
No. 35,203 (Fla. Sup. Ct., Feb. 1, 1967).
Astor Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Cabrera, 62 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1952).

6.

See 2

7.
8.

See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §378 (1934).
Sparks, Babcock v. Jackson -A PracticingAttorney's Reflections Upon the

BEALE, CONFLICT

OF LAWS §377.2 (1935).
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subjected to much attack.9 The main criticisms of the rule are that
the place of the wrong is often purely fortuitous and that the rule
fails to consider legitimate interests of any state other than the state
where the wrong was committed. 10 Another criticism is that the
traditional rule fails to consider that some "conflicts" may be illusory
because one or more of the states involved lacks a legitimate interest
in the outcome.11 Also, the need for uniformity and predictability
of result, so that the parties may control their actions accordingly,
12
is nonexistent in cases involving unintentional torts.
In the past few years many courts have appeared dissatisfied with
the rule of lex loci delicti. Many of these courts have not chosen to
abolish the rule, but rather to formulate exceptions' 3 or to circumvent it by treating substantive matters as procedural, thereby bringing
them under the law of the forum.'14 Several courts, however, have
discarded the rule and adopted a more flexible standard that allows
them to examine the policies and interests underlying the issue in
question in order to determine which state's substantive law to
apply. 5 This "grouping of contacts" or "center of gravity" approach
is similar to the modem approach to choice-of-laws situations in
contract law.:" The present draft of the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws also abandons the old rule and adopts the following
rule: "The local law of the state which has the most significant
relationship with the occurrence and with the parties determines their
rights and liabilities in tort."1 7
Opinion and Its Implications, 31 INS. COUNSEL J. 428 (1964).
9. See COOK, LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICr OF LAWS 311-46 (1942);
Morris, The Proper Law of a Tort, 64 HAv. L. REv. 881 (1951).
10. See Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their Role and
Utility, 58 HLAv. L. REv. 361 (1945); Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication
Versus Automation in the Conflict of Laws, 10 STAN. L. REv. 205, 239-41 (1957).
11. Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEXAs L. REv. 657 (1959).
12. Reese, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson-A Recent Development in
Conflict of Laws, 63 CoLum. L. R.,. 1251, 1254 (1963).
13. E.g., Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814
(1959) (family law exception).
14. E.g., Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953); Kilberg v.
Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
15. Johnson v. Johnson, 216 A.2d 781 (N.H. 1966); Babcock v. Jackson, 12
N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963); Griffith v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133
N.W.2d 408 (1965). The Delaware Supreme Court, however, has refused to adopt
a policy-centered analysis without legislative approval. Friday v. Smoot, 211 A.2d
594 (Del. 1965).
16. See Confederation Life Ass'n v. Ugalde, 151 So. 2d 315 (3d D.C.A. Fla.
1963); Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS §379(1) (Tent. Draft No. 9,

1964).
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In Hopkins the Florida Supreme Court joined the few courts that
have abandoned the traditional rule. The court reasoned that all
foreign law is applied in Florida according to the judicial principle
of comity; that the lex loci delicti rule for applying foreign tort law
is a subservient part of the general principle; and that judicial comity
does not require a court to enforce statutory policies of another state
to the prejudice of its own citizens or when they are repugnant to
its own public policy. The court recognized that the theoretical basis
of lex loci delicti is no longer acceptable, and that the rule often
yields unjust results. The court noted that there is no compelling
Florida precedent that requires application of the rule.", The court
then concluded that adoption of a more flexible rule would not do
any real violence to the principle of stare decisis in Florida and that
it would yield more just results. Justices Drew and Thomas dissented
contending that the new rule offers no advantages that would compel
them to discard the old rule.
The standard that the supreme court now adopts for solving choiceof-laws problems in unintentional tort cases is broad. It analyzes "the
policies underlying and the purpose of the conflicting laws and of the
relationship of the occurrence and of the parties to such policies and
purpose."' The court failed to give any specific guidelines concerning
how this rule will be applied in the future, and they failed to disclose
how they analyzed the particular fact setting in Hopkins.20 In Griffith
v. United Air Lines, Inc.21 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted
the "grouping of contacts" or "center of gravity" approach and ana2
lyzed a fact setting on "all fours" with Hopkins: 2
The Pennsylvania court reasoned that the purposes of the Colorado limitation of damages recoverable in a wrongful death
action is to prevent Colorado's courts from speculating about the
amount of damages and to protect Colorado defendants from
burdensome judgments. The purpose behind the lack of a
damage limitation in Pennsylvania is to adequately compensate
18. All but one Florida case announcing the rule of lex loci delicti lacked an
actual conflict of applicable substantive law. DeSalvo v. Curry, 160 Fla. 7, 33 So.
2d 215 (1948); Myrick v. Griffin, 146 Fla. 148, 200 So. 383 (1941); Young v. Garcia,
172 So. 2d 243 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1965); Meyer v. Pitzele, 122 So. 2d 228 (3d D.C.A.
Fla. 1960). In Astor Elec. Serv., Inc., v. Cabrera, 62 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1952), there
was an actual conflict but Florida was both the forum state and the place of the
wrong.
19. No. 35,203 (Fla. Sup. Ct., Feb. 1, 1967).
20. Id.
21. 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
22. Insert "Florida" for "Pennsylvania," "Illinois" for "Colorado," and "California" for "Delaware" to see the relationship of the Pennsylvania court's reasoning
to Hopkins.
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plaintiffs for their losses. Since the plaintiff is a Pennsylvania
resident and the relationship was entered into in Pennsylvania
and the defendant is a Delaware corporation, Colorado has no
legitimate interest in the outcome.
The Florida Supreme Court probably analyzed the purposes of the
conflicting laws and the relationship of the parties and occurrences
to them in a similar manner. The Florida court further said that the
facts given in the certificate did not indicate that any third state
had a more significant relationship to the parties than did Florida.
While this new standard was easy to apply to the facts in Hopkins,
there will be cases with more complex fact situations in the future.
New York, the first state to adopt the new standard, has had some
difficulty applying it to more complex fact situations. 23 Future difficulty will stem not only from more complex fact situations but also
from a lack of agreement among scholars as to the relevance of specific
contacts, 24 whether contacts should be weighted quantitatively or
qualitatively,25 and as to which state's law should apply when the
contacts are evenly balanced.26 Courts also disagree about the scope
of the new standard. 27 In short, the scope of the standard announced
by Hopkins will have to be determined by further litigation. Nevertheless, this decision is another step in the development of a judicial
system that considers the legitimate interests of all parties, even
though time-consuming and difficult, rather than one that blindly

23.

See Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).
24. Currie would have the forum apply its own law when involved in a case
of real conflict. See Currie, On the Displacement of the Law of the Forum, 58
CoLUM. L. REv. 964 (1958); Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication Versus
Automation in the Conflict of Laws, 10 STAN. L. REv. 205 (1958). Ehrenzweig
agrees except that he places much emphasis on insurance. See Ehrenzweig, Guest
Statutes in the Conflict of Laws- Towards a Theory of Enterprise Liability Under
"Foreseeable and Insurable Laws" (pts. 1-3), 69 YALE L.J. 595, 795, 979 (1960);
Ehrenzweig, The Lex Fori-Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws, 58 MICH. L.
REv. 637 (1960). Baxter would choose the law of the jurisdiction whose policy
would be most impaired if its law were not applied. See Baxter, Choice of Law
and the FederalSystem, 16 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1963). Weintraub places emphasis on
the element of unfair surprise of the defendant. See Weintraub, A Method for
Solving Conflict Problems-Torts, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 215 (1963).
25. See Note, New York and the Conflict of Laws: A Retreat, 18 STAN. L. Riv.
699, 703 (1966).
26. See Weintraub, supra note 24, at 249-51; Note, Wilcox v. Wilcox (Wis.)
133 N.W.2d 408: The Beginning of a New Approach to Conflict of Laws in Tort
Cases, 1966 WIs. L. REv. 913.
27. Compare Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964)
and Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965), with Dym v.
Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).
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